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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Angel Investors, LLC is unaware of any parties other than those identified in the 
caption of this Opening Brief of Appellant. 
L The Appellant, Angel Investors, LLC, shall be referred to herein as 
"Angel." 
2. The Appellee, XanGo, LLC, shall be referred to herein as "KanCo." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supi V'tion over this appeal pursuant • J•• "•! ^n 
§ 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1. via uie u.. 
Utah R. Civ,. P. I2(b)( I) withoi if fin ;( allowing Appellant to conduct discovery, when the 
; *, .!).. .; i ourt considered al I, idavits of other members of the limited liability company in 
support of the motion to dismiss w nu . 
discovery? 
Standard of Review: A dismissal pursuant t< ]" r" p ' l l U u ] x ror lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness. Canjleld \. Lay ton c '//>, -005 UT 
60, Tf 6 ' " " ' i ^ p " ! , ) . " ^ ' Imi'.di* 0- ,!.-' HhthMis, such as subject matter 
for correctness."); see U.S. West, inc. v. Tristan^ 182 F.3d 
1202, 1206 (10th Cm 1999) (review of a Fed. R. Civ. P. I 2 ( b n , , dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is de novo).1 r- = p. rposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
i u< rations « me i ompu:!;; 
1
 The language of Rulr I ^ ii d '• .i -. «• rules is nearly identical to the Utah M U 
State v. All Real Property, Residence, <& Appurtenances, 2005 UT 90, )\ 10 n I ! r ' I1 M 
693; Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Compiler's Notes. Reliance on cases interpreting the federal 
rules is appropriate where the Utah and federal rules are "substantially similar.11 Tucker v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, <\\ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947. 
I 
and must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Moseke v. Miller & Smith, 
Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D.C. Va. 2002). 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the district court in its 
December 21, 2007 Ruling. See R.356 at 3-4, 6. 
Issue 2: Did the District Court err in granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) based on its determination that the Appellant lacked standing as an 
inadequate representative under Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 and could not proceed as a class of 
one, when other members of the limited liability company signed affidavits that did not 
challenge the allegations of malfeasance but rather stated the members preferred the 
company not be involved in the derivative lawsuit? 
Standard of Review: A dismissal pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness. See Canfield, 2005 UT 60, [^ 6 n. I, 
TJ 10; Tristani, 182 F.3 at 1206. Jurisdictional questions are reviewed for correctness, 
Canfield, 2005 UT 60, \ 10, and standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Jones v. 
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, U 12, 154 P.3d 808. 
Although any factual findings that bear on the issue will be reviewed with some 
deference, the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to 
request a particular relief is primarily a question of law. Le Vanger v. Highland Estates 
Properties Owners Assoc., 2003 UT App. 377, |^ 8, 80 P.3d 569 (addressing standing in a 
derivative action under Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1). 
? 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the district court in its 
December 21, 2007 Ruling. See R.356 at 4-12. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
UtahR. Civ. P. 23.1:2 
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right 
of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the coq^oration or association having 
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be 
verified and shall allege (I) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of 
the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved 
on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to 
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, 
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or 
for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that 
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or 
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the coiporation or association. The 
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and 
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or 
members in such manner as the court directs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1701: 
Right of action 
A member may bring an action in the right of a company to recover a judgment in its 
favor: 
2
 Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 was amended effective November I, 2007,and is now-
reorganized and renumbered as Utah R. Civ. P. 23 A. Rule 23A is substantively identical 
to the original Rule 23.1. Because Rule 23.1 is the Rule relied upon below by the parties 
and the district court, this appeal will also refer to Rule 23.1 rather than Rule 23 A. 
3 
(1) if the managers or, if no managers, the members with authority to do so have refused 
to bring the action and the decision of the managers or members not to sue constitutes an 
abuse of discretion or involves a conflict of interest that prevents an unbiased exercise of 
judgment; or 
(2) if an effort to cause those managers or members to bring the action is not likely to 
succeed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in Court Below: 
This case centers on the right of Appellant Angel Investors, LLC (''Anger1) to 
bring a derivative suit pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 and Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1701 
on behalf of XanGo, LLC ("XanGo") against the majority members of XanGo (the 
"Defendants"). 
In May 2007, Angel made several written requests, both to counsel for XanGo and 
the Defendants, that XanGo pursue claims against the managing members of XanGo. 
When these attempts proved unsuccessful, Angel filed a Complaint in June 2007, 
bringing a derivative action on behalf of XanGo against Defendants. See R. 14. 
The next month, in July 2007, Defendants filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the derivative action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
R. 18. The motion was supported by the affidavits of 19 XanGo members. See R. 144. 
Angel opposed this motion. See R.238. Angel's opposition was supported by 
declarations of counsel and Stephen Bean. See R. 158,213,216,238. Angel also filed a 
Rule 56f affidavit requesting time to conduct discovery. See R.238. In addition, Angel 
4 
filed a motion to strike portions of the 19 affidavits submitted by Defendants. See R. 147; 
154. Defendants responded by filing a motion to strike portions of the Bean declaration. 
SeeR.263;270. 
The district court heard oral arguments on these motions in October 2007, see R. 
360, and on December 2 I, 2007, the court issued its Ruling. See R.356; 359 (Addendum 
A). In its Ruling, the district court granted in part and denied in part Angel's motion to 
strike portions of the 19 member affidavits and granted Defendants' motion to strike 
portions of the Bean declaration. See id. The district court also denied Angel's request 
for time to conduct discovery and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the derivative 
suit. See id. 
Statement of Facts: 
Angel is a limited liability company doing business in the State of Utah. R. 14 at 
\ 2. XanGo is also a Utah limited liability company, R. 14 at \ 3, whose meteoric success 
as a multilevel marketing company is paralleled only by the extravagance of its six 
founding members who controlled 86 percent of the company as of September 30, 2006, 
see R.238 at vi; Addendum E at^j 12. 
To raise money in the early days of the business, the founding members sold 
minority interests to other entities and individuals, and Angel alleges that it became a 
5 
member of XanGo when it invested money in connection with the formation of XanGo.3 
Id. at iv. The remaining 14 percent of XanGo not owned by the controlling members is 
owned by the minority investors, whose respective ownership percentages range from . 10 
percent to 3.3 percent. Addendum E at f^ 12. Appellant Angel Investors owns at most 
one percent of the company. 
When some minority investors began to question the extravagant salaries, 
distributionsm and benefits paid to the founding members, XanGo's founding members 
began buying minority interests from the original investors. Rather than having these 
interests acquired by the LLC, thus benefitting all interest holders, XanGo gave or loaned 
money to the founding members to acquire the minority interests. See Addendum E at 
Tfl[ 12-13; R. 14; R.238. The result of these actions was the misuse of a company 
opportunity and the misuse of LLC funds to increase the holdings of the founding 
members at the expense of the LLC and the minority interest holders. See R. 14; R.238. 
As a result of these concerns, among others, Angel sued XanGo directly. The 
direct action ("Direct Lawsuit") is currently pending before Judge Fred Howard of the 
Fourth District Court. See Angel Investors, LLC v. XanGo, LLC, Civil No. 060402848. 
In the Direct Lawsuit, Angel alleges, inter alia, that XanGo has denied Angel the ability 
and right to inspect XanGo's financial records, that the founding members have engaged 
3
 In both the Direct Lawsuit and the derivative suit, the district court has refused to 
make a finding as to whether Angel is a member of XanGo, ruling there are factual 
disputes regarding this issue. See R.356 at 6 (Addendum A). 
6 
in oppressive conduct against Angel, and have otherwise mismanaged and wasted 
corporate assets. Id. The Direct Lawsuit includes a claim for judicial dissolution 
pursuant to Utah Code Ami. § 48-2c-l2l0(2)(b). Id 
The complaint in the Direct Lawsuit was filed by former counsel for Angel. When 
Angel changed counsel, it was recognized that the fiduciary claim alleged in the Direct 
Lawsuit should have been brought as a derivative claim. See R.238 at iii-iv. As a result, in 
May 2007, counsel for Angel wrote the registered agent of XanGo, Mr. A. Craig Hale, 
requesting that XanGo pursue claims against the managing members of XanGo, including 
but not limited to, Aaron Garrity, Gary Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, Kent 
Wood, and Bryan Davis. The letter set forth the basis of the proposed lawsuit. (A copy 
of that letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A.) The only response which 
counsel for Angel received was a letter by which Mr. Hale asserted that he had no need to 
respond to the demand to institute action for 90 days, under the Utah Revised Business 
Corporations Act. (A copy of Mr. Hale's letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 
B.) 
In addition, Mr. Brad Johnson, a member of Angel, sent a letter to each of the 
Defendants demanding that they pursue the claims which are now incorporated in the 
derivative suit. Angel received no response to this demand. (A copy of Mr. Johnson's 
letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit C.) 
7 
Counsel for Angel also made a demand on counsel for XanGo, Mr. Robert S. 
Clark and Mr. David C. Reymann, both orally and in writing, requesting that they permit 
the amendment of the Direct Lawsuit to permit the pursuit of these derivative claims in 
that direct suit. Counsel for XanGo either ignored or refused such requests. R. 14 at f^ 12. 
After these efforts proved unsuccessful, in June 2007, Angel filed a Complaint 
bringing a derivative action on behalf of XanGo against Defendants pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 23.1 and Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-l70L See R.14. The Complaint alleges that 
XanGo's founding members have engaged in conduct which breaches fiduciary duties 
owed to the company and its minority interest holders, including mismanaging the 
company's affairs, misapplying or wasting company assets, and misappropriating 
company assets for their own personal benefits. R. 14 at j^ 21. 
Specifically, Angel alleged in its Complaint that Defendants have taken personal 
loans from the company aggregating millions of dollars, id. at |^ 14; used company funds 
to acquire minority interests from other members and assigned such membership interests 
to themselves, thus appropriating to themselves opportunities belonging to XanGo and all 
of its members, id. at f^ 15; received increased distributions from the company based on 
their increased ownership interests acquired with company funds, id. at ^ 16; used 
company funds to finance large single-family residences for themselves in transactions 
that are not arms-length and that have not required the controlling members to recognize 
the use of such homes as income or distributions, id. at j^ 17; had exclusive use of 
8 
company-leased automobiles without paying reasonable lease rates or recognizing the use 
of the automobiles as income or distributions, id. at J^ 18; and paid themselves excessive 
compensation and excessive reimbursements for alleged business expenses, id. at j^ 19. 
Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that xAngel lacks standing to 
bring this derivative suit because it does not fairly and adequately represent other XanGo 
shareholders who are similarly situated. See R. 18; 144. In support of this motion, 
Defendants attached affidavits from themselves and thirteen other minority members, all 
opposing the derivative action and asserting that Angel does not fairly and adequately 
represent their interests. See R. 1447 Exhibit B. Tellingly, each of the affidavits carefully 
avoids denying the specific factual allegations in the Complaint regarding Defendants' 
conduct. See id. This failure to deny is especially peculiar coming from the Defendants 
themselves, who would know whether they had engaged in the alleged conduct. All 
nineteen affidavits contain substantively uniform statements, and representative affidavits 
are attached as Addendum B. 
Angel opposed this motion, arguing that the nineteen affidavits were suspect 
because each of the affiants had at least one collateral reason to vouch for the Defendants, 
unrelated to the merits of this lawsuit; Angel also argued that the nineteen affidavits were 
irrelevant to the standing issue because none of those members was similarly situated to 
Angel. R.238. Angel argued that there are no other similarly situated XanGo members, 
9 
and thus Angel should be allowed to proceed in the derivative suit as a "class of one.11 Id. 
Angel supported this argument with declarations of counsel and Stephen Bean. Id., 
Exhibits A & B (Addendum C-E). 
Because no discovery had been conducted, Angel also filed an affidavit pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(0 requesting additional time in which to conduct discovery 
regarding this issue, see R.238, Exhibit D (Addendum E), as well as a motion to strike 
portions of the Defendants' nineteen affidavits. See R. 147; 154. Defendants then filed a 
motion to strike portions of the Bean declaration. See R.263; 270. 
In its Ruling on these motions, the court granted in part and denied in part Angel's 
motion to strike, striking paragraphs 2, 5, 6, and part of 8 from the nineteen affidavits; the 
court also granted Defendants' motion to strike, striking paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 from 
the Bean declaration. R.356 at 1-4 (Addendum A). The court denied Angel's request for 
additional time in which to conduct discovery, ruling that because the motion to dismiss 
was filed pursuant to Elule 12(b)(1), Rule 56(0 does not apply. Id. at 3-4, 6. 
The court then granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Angel was 
not a fair and adequate representative of other XanGo members as required under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1. Id. at 6-11. In granting the Defendants' motion, the district court 
found convincing the affidavits produced by Defendants, which, according to the court, 
indicated that even if the alleged malfeasance is occurring, the members prefer to allow 
its continuance rather than allow XanGo to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. See id. 
10 
The district court was clearly unhappy with this conclusion, since according to the court, 
it "does not condone any malfeasance on the part of XanGo's founders," but nevertheless 
could not allow a derivative suit to continue "against the will of all other similarly 
situated XanGo owners." Id. at 12. 
Angel now appeals dismissal of the derivative suit. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue in this appeal is whether Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 is intended to prevent 
derivative suits when the majority of members in a limited liability company decide that a 
derivative suit should not proceed, even when those same members do not challenge the 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the company. While this issue has never 
been directly decided by Utah's appellate courts, this issue is one of significant public 
policy which implicates a very important aspect of corporate governance, i.e., a minority 
member's ability to challenge oppressive and wrongful conduct on the part of the 
majority members, regardless of how unpopular the suit may be from the perspective of 
other members. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Defendants1 motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for two reasons: (I) because the issue of fair and 
adequate representation is a fact-sensitive inquiry, the court erred in granting the motion 
without first allowing Angel time to conduct any disco very relevant to this issue; and (2) 
the court erred in determining that Angel is an inadequate representative under 
11 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1, because it improperly based this determination on a hypothetical 
conflict of interest and on the lack of support from purported similarly situated XanGo 
members. 
First, the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss without 
first allowing Angel additional time m which to conduct discovery. While the district 
court correctly recognized in its Ruling that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is not 
automatically converted into a Rule 56 motion simply because evidence outside the 
pleadings is considered, the court erred in assuming that this principle foreclosed Angel's 
request for time to conduct discovery. In fact, courts often allow discovery m such cases, 
even when the motion to dismiss is not formally converted into a motion for summary 
judgment. The need to allow discovery is particularly strong when a court is making a 
determination of fair and adequate representation under Rule 23.1 because this 
determination is fact-specific. No discovery had been conducted in the case at the time the 
motion to dismiss was filed. Angel needed discovery in order to determine the 
relationship of other minority members with the controlling members or promises or 
threats that had allegedly been made to get the minority members to disagree with the 
derivative action. Without a record of any kind, Angel was unable to adequately rebut the 
allegations made in the Defendants' motion to dismiss and supporting affidavits. The 
district court therefore erred in denying Angel's request for time to conduct discovery. 
12 
Second, the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss based on 
its determination that Angel is not a fair and adequate representative in the derivative 
action as required by Rule 23.1. The district court based its determination on two 
grounds, both of which were improper grounds for dismissal of the derivative suit. The 
first ground relied upon by the district court was its finding that a potential conflict 
existed between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in the derivative 
suit. This ground is insufficient to support the district court's Ruling because conflicts 
that are merely hypothetical are insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative action. 
The second ground relied upon by the district court was its finding that other XanGo 
minority members were similarly situated to Angel, and, as a result, Angel could not 
proceed in the derivative action without their support. This ground is also insufficient to 
support the district court's Ruling because the minority members identified by the court 
as similarly situated actually have ownership and economic interests which are 
antagonistic to Angel's interests. Although these other minority members oppose the 
derivative suit, this lack of support is irrelevant because there is the very real possibility 
that in opposing Angel's efforts, these members may have been motivated by individual 
interests, rather than the good of the corporation. Rule 23.1 was never intended to prevent 
derivative suits simply because the other members prefer to allow the malfeasance to 
continue rather than allow the company to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. As such, 
Angel should therefore be allowed to proceed as a class of one. 
13 
For these reasons, the district court committed reversible error m granting 
Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), and this Court should reverse the 
district court's Ruling of December 12, 2007. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS WITHOUT ALLOWING ANGEL ADDITIONAL TIME IN 
WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
The district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss without first 
allowing Angel additional time in which to conduct discovery. Angel needed this 
discovery in order to deteniime the relationship of other members to the majority interest 
owners or promises or threats that had allegedly been made to get the minority members 
to disagree with the derivative action. See Addendum E. Without such discovery, Angel 
could not fully respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss or adequately rebut the 
supporting affidavits. The court denied Angel's Rule 56(f) motion, however, because it 
concluded that Rule 56(0 w a s inapplicable to motions to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1). 
Addendum A at 3-4, 6. 
Although the district court cited no authority for this conclusion, it was apparently 
relying on cases such as Wheeler v. MePherson, in which the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that Rule 12 "does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) tlirough (5) 
. . . into motions for summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative 
evidence relating to the basis for the motion." 2002 UT 16, ^ j 20, 40 P.3d 632 (quotation 
14 
omitted); see Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App. 388, ffi| 7-8, 81 P.3d 769 
(same). 
While it may be true that motions to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) are not 
automatically subject to conversion to a motion for summary judgment,4 the district court 
erred m assuming that this principle foreclosed Angel's request for time to conduct 
discovery. It did not. In fact, in many cases involving motions to dismiss based on 
subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5), discovery is appropriate and often necessary- whether 
or not Rule 56(f) is the most proper label for a motion requesting such discovery.5 See, 
e.g. Coombs, 2003 UT App. 388, ^ 7-8 (noting the general principle that motions based 
on subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5) are not automatically converted into motions for 
summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the 
4
 Although Rule 12 conversion to a motion for summary judgment may not be 
automatic, there are some circumstances in which such a conversion is justified. For 
example, the court is required to convert a 12(b)(1) motion to a 12(b)(6) motion or Rule 
56 motion "when resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of 
the case. The jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits when subject matter 
jurisdiction is dependent on the same statute that provides the basis for the substantive 
claim." Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000); see Robinson v. 
Union Pacific R.R., 245 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that when the 
subject matter jurisdiction is dependent upon the same statute that provides the basis for 
the substantive claim, the issues of jurisdiction and the merits are "intertwined," and if the 
court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction can be converted to a motion for summary judgment). 
3
 The label a party uses to name its motion is not dispositive. See Canfield v. 
Layton City, 2005 UT 60, \ 6 n. I, 122 P.3d 622 (stating that although the parties 
consistently referred to the motion as a 12(b)(6) motion, the record made it clear that what 
the court was actually being asked to review was a 12(b)(1) motion). 
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basis for the motion, yet allowing the parties to submit affidavits and conduct limited 
discovery on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss); Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 
271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cm 2001) (explaining that a 12(b)(1) motion can go beyond 
the allegations and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based, the 
court has discretion to "allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary 
hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts") (quotation omitted). 
Notably, in cases where this Court has upheld the denial of a plaintiffs discovery 
request made in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff had already 
conceded the essential facts upon which the motion to dismiss was based. For example, 
in Wheeler, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed both the denial of the plaintiffs' discovery 
request and the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal based on plaintiffs' failure to file a proper notice 
of claim - but only after it specifically noted that the plaintiffs had conceded that they did 
not direct and deliver their notices to the proper party. Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, ^  20. This 
Court concluded, Therefore, because plaintiffs admit the very facts necessary to 
dispose of their suit . . ., we rule that the district court did not err by denying plaintiffs 
discovery request." Id. (emphasis added). 
In a similar case, where the defendant had attached affidavits to a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion demonstrating that plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim, this Court again 
indicated that conversion to a Rule 56 motion was not required, not simply because the 
original motion was based on Rule 12(b)(1), but because the plaintiff had openly admitted 
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that she did not comply with notice of claim provisions. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82 
1^ 5, 987 P.2d 36. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that under these circumstances, the 
plaintiff''therefore cannot complain that the district court's treatment of the motion 
prevented her from rebutting the evidence establishing her failure to comply with the 
notice statute/' Id. 
Without such an admission, however, and when the facts necessary to dispose of 
the Rule 12(b)(1) motion are in dispute, discovery is necessary. The need to allow parties 
to conduct discovery is particularly strong when the court is making a determination of 
fair and adequate representation pursuant to Rule 23.1 because "[w]hether a particular 
plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of other similarly situated 
shareholders as required by Rule 23.1 turns upon the total facts and circumstances of 
each case." Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) 
(emphasis added); see 13 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5981.41 (stating that the determination of 
whether a plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of similarly situated 
shareholders and the corporation is fact-specific). 
Because of the fact-sensitive inquiry, a determination of fair and adequate 
representation under Rule 23.1 requires the establishment of some kind of record. See 
Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1997) ("Because there 
is no evidence in the record to support a finding that [plaintiff] is incapable of fairly 
representing the interests of the corporation in the derivative action while maintaining his 
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individual suit, the existence of both is no reason to deny him standing/') (emphasis 
added); Williams v. Service Corp. lnt\ 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. App. 1995) (ci[T]here is 
nothing in the record to indicate that [plaintiff] brought the . . . fa]ction as a mere guise 
to gain control of [the company].11) (emphasis added); Neusteter v. District Court, 675 
P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) ('These assertions [regarding whether plaintiffs fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders] are not supported by any 
evidence in the record . . . .") (emphasis added); cf. LeVanger v. Highland Estates 
Properties Owners Assoc, 2003 UT App. 377, % 16, 80 P.3d 569 (stating that there is 
"nothing in the record that suggests [defendant] ever waived the issue of standing" under 
Rule 23.1) (emphasis added). 
At the time the Defendants1 motion to dismiss was filed in this case, however, 
there was no record As explained in the Rule 56(f) affidavit filed by Angel's counsel, 
Richard J. Armstrong, no discovery had been conducted in this matter at the time the 
motion to dismiss was filed, and the parties had not even had the opportunity to meet and 
confer as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(f) to discuss a proposed case management 
order or proposed discovery plan. Addendum E at ffl| 4-5. 
Angel also submitted a declaration from Stephen Bean in response to Defendants' 
motion to dismiss, see Addendum D, but without depositions or any other discovery to 
support Mr. Bean's assertions and Angel's substantive arguments, Angel did not have an 
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adequate opportunity to rebut the Defendants' affidavits.6 Angel therefore requested time 
to conduct discovery in order to uncover evidence relating to whether Angel fairly and 
adequately represents the mterests of similarly situated members of XanGo, whether there 
are similarly situated members of XanGo, the percentages of ownership interests within 
the company, and the basis for the testimony provided in the nineteen affidavits submitted 
by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. Addendum E at f^lj 7, 10, 14. 
Without the opportunity to conduct this discovery or to create a record of any kind, 
Angel was unable to ''present by affidavit facts essential to justify" its position, nor did it 
have an "adequate opportunity to rebut materials outside the pleadings.'1 Wheeler, 2002 
UT 16, Tj 20. The district court therefore committed reversible error when it granted 
Defendants' motion to dismiss without first allowing Angel time in which to conduct 
discovery relevant to the motion to dismiss. 
6
 That Angel could not fully respond to the motion to dismiss without discovery is 
only further supported by the fact that several portions of Stephen Bean's declaration 
were struck by the district court not for problems with relevancy, but for lacking 
foundation or containing inadmissible hearsay. See Addendum A at 4. 
Angel submitted Mr. Bean's declaration in order to refute certain statements in the 
nineteen affidavits submitted by Defendants with their motion to dismiss. Mr. Bean's 
declaration was submitted largely to supplement counsel's Rule 56(f) affidavit, however, 
by showing what discovery will likely uncover with regard to Angel's status as a fair and 
adequate representative of XanGo's members. See Addendum D. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS BASED ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT ANGEL DID NOT 
SATISFY THE "FAIR AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE" 
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23.1 
The district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the 
determination that Angel did not satisfy the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 for 
filing a derivative lawsuit. In their motion to dismiss; the Defendants argued that the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the derivative suit because 
Angel lacks standing under Rule 23.1, having failed to meet the requirement that it fairly 
and adequately represents the interests of other XanGo members. The district court 
granted Defendants' motion to dismiss on two grounds, see Addendum A at 11, both of 
which were improper grounds for dismissal of the derivative suit. 
First, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on its finding 
of a potential conflict between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in 
the derivative suit. Second, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss 
based on its finding that Angel is not a "class of one1' and therefore cannot proceed as a 
representative plaintiff without the support of other XanGo owners. Neither of these 
grounds supports the court's determination that Angel is not a fair and adequate 
representative plaintiff in the derivative suit, and thus the district court erred in granting 
the Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
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A. The Court Erred in Basing Its Determination on a Hypothetical 
Conflict Between Vngel's Interests in the Direct Suit and its Interests in 
the Derivative Suit. 
The district court erred m granting the motion to dismiss based on a potential 
conflict between Angel's mteiests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in the derivative 
action In its Ruling, the court recognized that there is no per se rule prohibiting a 
plaintiff m a direct suit from simultaneously representing members in a derivative suit and 
acknowledged that m tins case, *[i|t is possible that the Direct Lawsuit will not decrease 
[Angel's] interest in pursuing the derivative claims " Addendum A at 9 (emphasis 
added) Because in the Direct Lawsuit Angel seeks dissolution of XanGo, however, the 
district court found that the interests of Angel and the other non-defendant XanGo 
members aie "not aligned," and "there may be some actual conflict between [Angel's] 
interest m the Direct Lawsuit and is representation in the demative suit " Id (emphasis 
added) This finding of a potential conflict of interest is not sufficient to support the 
distuct court's Ruling 
The burden is on the defendant to prove to the district court that the plaintiff is an 
inadequate representative, and in this case, Defendants failed to show that Angel's 
interests are "sufficiently antagonistic" to the interests of the othei members so that Angel 
is not a fair and adequate representative See LeVanger v Highland Estates Properties 
Owners Assoc , 2003 UT App 377, ^ 18, 80 P 3d 569 (stating that the burden is on the 
defendant to show that the plaintiff is an inadequate representative under Rule 23 l), 
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7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1833 (same). In order to satisfy this burden, a defendant 
must show that a ^serious conflict" exists and that the plaintiff "'cannot be expected to act 
in the interest of others because doing so would harm the derivative plaintiffs other 
interests.^ 13 Fletcher Cyc. Coip. § 5981.42. Where, as here, the plaintiff has filed a 
verified complaint containing the proper allegations as required by Rule 23.1, the 
defendant must prove that the plaintiff is an inadequate representative. LeVanger, 2003 
UTApp. 377,U 18, 80P.3d569. 
Defendants did not satisfy this burden. Defendants presented no evidence 
whatsoever of any conflict, "serious'1 or otherwise. Defendants did not even allege that 
Angel's participation in the Direct Lawsuit would decrease its interest in vigorously 
pursuing the derivative action, and Defendants" unsupported allegation that Angel is only 
pursuing the derivative action to gain leverage against XanGo in the Direct Lawsuit was 
rejected by the district court.7 See Addendum A at 9. All Defendants brought before the 
district court was a general statement that each affiant was simply "aware that Angel 
7
 The allegation that Angel brought the derivative action only to gam leverage in 
the Direct Lawsuit is not only unsupported, but actually disproved by the evidence. When 
Angel changed counsel, it was recognized that the fiduciary claim in the Direct Lawsuit 
should have been brought as a derivative claim. Angel's counsel therefore attempted to 
obtain Defendant's consent to simply amending the Direct Lawsuit to make the change. 
Defendant refused. Accordingly, after requesting that XanGo1 s board assume 
responsibility for the derivative claim, and after that request was rejected, Angel filed the 
separate derivative action. 
AngeLs intent was always to move to consolidate these actions, but the motion to 
dismiss the derivative action was filed so early in the process that Angel had not yet had 
the chance to do so. 
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Investois has also bi ought lawsuit alleging duect claims against XanGo and seeking 
damages from the company,' Addendum B at ^ 7 and 8 combined with the conclusory 
assertion that a conflict must exist because Angel seeks both monetary damages m the 
derivative suit and dissolution in the Direct Lawsuit 
Such conclusory and unsupported assertions are insufficient to prove that Angel is 
an inadequate representative m the derivative action See Williams v Service Corp Int /, 
459 S E 2d 621, 622-623 (Ga Ct App 1995) ("The mere assertion that [the plaintiffs] 
interests may have been antagonistic to [the corporation] does not necessitate a 
dismissal ") Simultaneous direct and derivative actions are permitted where the alleged 
"antagonism" between the direct and derivative actions is merely a 'surface duality," In 
re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig , 455 F Supp 999, 1014 (N D III 1978), 
and derivative claims seeking monetary damages on behalf of the corporation are not 
incompatible with direct claims seeking dissolution of the corporation 
The case of Hall v Tennessee Dressed Beef Co , is instructive In Hall, a minority 
shareholder brought a derivative action against a majority shareholder, and 
simultaneously brought a direct suit asserting claims involving the majority shareholder 
which included a claim against the company for judicial dissolution 9^7 S W 2d 536 
(Term 1997) Siding with the plaintiff, the court in Hall held that there vv as no conflict of 
interest precluding the plaintiff from asserting both the direct claim against the company 
for dissolution and the derivative claim against the majority shareholder Id at 540 
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The Coloiado Supreme Court offered another perspective and explained, 
^Derivative claims aie not brought by good Samaritans concerned lor the welfare of 
corporations, they are biought by shareholders seeking to piotect their investments 
There is no contradiction between plaintiffs ^ request for restoration of corporate assets 
and their concunent application for dissolution because ot the prospect of continued 
mismanagement ot the corporation, both remedies are directed at protection of their 
investments " Neusteter v District Court, 675 P 2d 1,8 (Colo 1984) (en banc) 
While no Utah cases have explicitly held that a plaintiff can simultaneously bring 
both a derivative and a duect action, Utah courts have obv lously assumed in prior cases 
that theie is nothing inconsistent in doing so For example, m GLFP Ltd v CL Mgmt 
Ltd , the Utah Court of Appeals explained that actions alleging mismanagement, breach 
of fiduciary duties and appropriation or waste of corporate opportunitres and assets 
generally belong to the corporation, and a shareholder must bi mg such actions on its 
behalf 2007 Ul App 131,^8-9, 12-15, 163 P 3d 636 While the court did not analyze 
the specific question ot whether the plaintiff fairly and adequately represented interests ot 
other shareholders undei Rule 23 I, the court clearly indicated that a derivative claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty can co-exist with a direct claim by the same plamtiff for judicial 
dissolution Id at ^] 7-11, 12-15 (contrasting a shareholder s denvativ e claim on behalf 
of the cotporation and a direct claim for injury to the shareholder, not the corporation, and 
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concluding that the plaintiffs allegations set forth a sufficient basis-separate and apart 
from the derivative claims-for seeking judicial dissolution). 
Here, the relief sought m this derivative action is not incompatible or inconsistent 
with the relief being sought by Angel in the Direct Lawsuit. If Angel proves XanGo's 
breach of fiduciary claim in this case, the individual Defendants will have to pay damages 
to XanGo and those damages would then be paid out to all members in the "winding up" 
of the company after dissolution. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-l30l (winding up of a 
dissolved company consists of "collecting all amounts owed to the company . . . and 
distributing all remaining company assets and property among the members of the 
company according to their interests")- Angel's derivative claim seeks relief which will 
benefit the company, and therefore all members. Similarly, Angel's Direct Lawsuit seeks 
relief for oppression of all minority members, and the claim for dissolution, if successful, 
would force a reorganization of the enterprise that would result in a fairer return for all 
members. 
The dissolution claim in the Direct Lawsuit, therefore, is completely compatible 
with the breach of fiduciary claim in this case. Defendants failed to satisfy their burden 
by showing that any conflict exists which would make Angel an inadequate representative 
under Rule 23.1. 
Because the Defendants failed to satisfy this burden, there was no evidence before 
the district court which would have allowed it to find that an actual, serious conflict of 
25 
interests exists-and the court in fact made no such finding. See Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy 
Ltd., 725 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that in order to dismiss a derivative 
plaintiff for this reason, the court must first find that the plaintiff has interests 
antagonistic to the other shareholders in the derivative action). 
Rather, as indicated above, the district court only found that a potential conflict of 
interest exists, finding that "there may be some actual conflict between [Angers] interest 
in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative suit," and even 
acknowledging that it is "possible" that Angel's participation in the Direct Lawsuit will 
not decrease its interest in pursuing the derivative claims for the benefit of all non-
defendant XanGo owners. Addendum A at 9 (emphasis added). This finding is 
insufficient, however, because conflicts which are merely potential or hypothetical are 
insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative action. See Williams v. Service Corp. 
Int'l, 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] purely hypothetical dispute will not 
necessitate dismissal.11); 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1833 (same); see also In re 
Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (D.C. III. 1978) ("At 
this stage of the proceedings there is merely a potential conflict of interest present. 
Moreover, if this potential conflict should crystallize, for example, if and when the 
question of remedy is reached, the court has sufficient authority to deal with any problems 
that may arise."). 
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Without a finding of an actual, seuous conflict arising fiom Angel's simultaneous 
piosecution ol both the Direct Lawsuit and the derivative action, there is no basis for the 
district court's conclusion that Angel is not a fair and adequate representative m the 
derivative suit The district couit committed reversible erroi m granting Defendants 
motion to dismiss on this ground 
B. The District Court Erred in Basing Its Determination on the Lack of 
Support For the Derivative Action From Other XanGo Shareholders 
The district court also erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on the lack of 
support for the derivative action from other XanGo members The fair and adequate 
representation requirement of Rule 23 I is not intended to pievent a derivative action 
when the majority of members m a limited liability company oppose the derivative action 
simply because they prefer to allow the alleged malfeasance to continue lather than allow 
the company to be involved m a derivative lawsuit In this situation, no othet XanGo 
members are similarly situated to Angel, and the court mistakenly concluded that Angel 
cannot proceed m the derivative suit as a *wclass of one " 
In support of their motion to dismiss, the Defendants submitted the affidavits of 
nineteen XanGo members, including themselves, who opposed the derivative action See, 
e g Addendum B The district court narrowed dovv n this potential class of injured 
minority shareholders by eliminating from its consideration the six Defendants, the seven 
XanGo employees, and the two family members of Defendants who submitted affidav its 
See Addendum A. at 10-11 That left foui affiants the Bederra Group, the Genesis 
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Group, and the Grimmers - who the district court determined to be similarly situated to 
Angel because any benefit conferred through the derivative suit would be shared by all 
XanGo members. Id. at 7, 11. The court therefore concluded that Angel could not 
maintain the derivative action as a "class of one11 because it would not "receive a separate 
or distinct benefit by prevailing in the derivative action/' Id. at 7. 
The district court erred in reaching this conclusion, however, because no other 
XanGo members are similarly situated to Angel, including the four members identified by 
the district court. In particular, the court erred in its definition of the similarly situated 
class of members. The similarity of benefits which could be received in a successful 
derivative action is not the proper criteria for determining whether shareholders are 
similarly situated; rather, the determination is more often based on the characteristics of 
the shareholders' ownership interests and relationships with the defendants.8 When these 
characteristics indicate that the other minority shareholders are not likely to act in the best 
interests of the corporation, the courts consistently allow the plaintiff to proceed in the 
derivative action as a legitimate class of one. 
8
 Even the district court seemed to implicitly recognize this principle when it 
eliminated from its consideration any affidavits filed by the Defendants, relatives of the 
Defendants, or employees of XanGo. See Addendum A at 11 (refusing to consider 
affidavits of affiants who "have an employee or family relationship to the Defendants or 
the company of which the Defendants are the majority owners"). The affiants who were 
excluded from consideration as possible similarly situated members were necessarily 
excluded because of their ownership interests and relationships with the defendants. 
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For example, in Jordan v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., the plaintiff was one of four 
shareholders in a closely held corporation and alleged that the defendant, a principal of 
the company, improperly conducted the affairs of the company so as to ^squeeze out" the 
plaintiff and obtam her interest in the company for less than it was worth. 728 F. Supp. 
409 (W.D Va. 1990). The defendant challenged the plaintiffs standing as a fair and 
adequate representative of similarly situated shareholders. Id. at 413. In rejecting that 
challenge, the court found that the plaintiff was a legitimate class of one because she was 
the only shareholder who had not entered into a voting-trust agreement which had pooled 
the voting control of the other shareholders and gave voting control of the stock to the 
corporate president. Id. ("Clearly important in a case such as this, where mismanagement 
and oppression are alleged, is the existence of any stock voting arrangement which alters 
the power structure of the corporation from that which appears on the face of a list of 
percentage ownership."). 
And, in Larson v. Dumke, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not similarly 
situated with other shareholders where each non-defendant shareholder had an economic 
interest in supporting the current management. 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Because of this shared economic interest with the defendants, the court concluded that 
"[tjhere is the very real possibility that in refusing to join with or in actively opposing [the 
plaintiffs] efforts, the non-defendant shareholders may have been motivated by 
individual interests, rather than the good of the corporation.11 Id. 
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Similarly, each of the four XanGo members identified by the court as similarly 
situated has some economic interest in supporting the current management of XanGo, and 
at least three of the four have signed the 2005 Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement (''Amended Operating Agreement"), which Angel opposes and has not signed. 
The Bederra Group has signed the Amended Operating Agreement and has an economic 
interest in supporting the Defendants as one of XanGo's vendors. R.238 at 7-8. The 
Grimmers have similarly signed the Amended Operating Agreement and also have an 
economic interest in supporting the Defendants as Class B Share Owners under the 
Amended Operating Agreement, which gives them a board position and special status 
with some management control. Id. 
While Genesis Group has allegedly not signed the 2005 Amended and Restated 
Operating Agreement, it is not similarly situated to Angel because it has indicated its 
desire, along with the other minority owners, to allow the misfeasance in the company to 
continue in perpetuity. Genesis Group was once a supporter of Angels1 efforts and 
actually helped finance the Direct Lawsuit before being threatened by XanGo. R.211-12, 
1fl|6-7. The two principals of Genesis Group, Hugh Biesinger and Mike Mansfield, 
expressly asked Angel, before the derivative and direct actions were filed, to proceed with 
the Direct Lawsuit as it was a direct benefit to them. R.212, \6. They also asked that 
their involvement in financing and drafting the complaint be kept confidential from 
XanGo as they were worried it would ruin their opportunity to sell their shares back to the 
30 
company R 211-12 [^6 Genesis Group apparently changed its mind w ith regard to the 
derivative action and the Direct Lawsuit when it signed an affidavit stating that it did not 
agree with the legal actions being taken by Angel Angel was prevented from exploring 
through discovery Genesis' reasons for now disagreeing with the actions Angel has taken 
to enforce its minority interests Angel should have been given the chance to conduct 
discovery on these material facts 
Angel is unique because of its continued opposition to the Amended Operating 
Agreement, because it alone has no economic interest in supporting the Defendants or 
current XanGo management, and because it alone wants to put a stop to management's 
malfeasance Angel alleges, among other things, that the Defendants attempted to use the 
Amended Operating Agreement to oppress Angel and coax it into submission with the 
Defendants' demands Thus, Angel is a class of one and is therefore an adequate 
representative pursuant to Rule 23 I 
In the end, whether other minority XanGo members support the derivative suit is 
irrelevant because "the lack of support for the derivative suit, m and of itself, does not 
indicate that [the plaintiff] is an inadequate representative " Larson, 900 F 2d at 1368 [n 
a case that is strikingly similar to this case, a plaintiff was allowed to proceed as a class of 
one even though all of the other minority shareholders m the closely held corporation 
disavowed the plaintiffs derivative action based on waste, fraud, and breach of fiduciary 
duty, and stated that they were content with the salaries being paid to the directors and 
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majority shareholders. Brandon v. Brandon Constr. Co., 116 S.W.2d 349, 351, 353 (Ark. 
1989). The court m that case concluded that cc[a]lthough the other minority shareholders 
have disavowed the action of the [plaintiff] and indicated they do not wish to continue the 
action, she is not prohibited from doing so." Id.; see also Eye Site Inc. v. Blackburn, 79 
S.W.2d 160, 162 (Texas 1990) (finding that there could be a legitimate "class of one" 
under Rule 23.1 where a sole dissenting shareholder of a closely held corporation brought 
a derivative action against the other shareholders). 
In such cases, ";[t]he mere fact that the other shareholders were willing to go along 
with a violation of the rights of the corporation did not foreclose the [plaintiff] from 
maintaining her action," Brandon, 776 N.W.2d at 352, and the courts were "particularly 
persuaded" by the fact that a contrary rule would leave the plaintiff and the coiporation 
without a remedy for the defendants1 alleged misconduct. Eye Site, Inc., 796 S.W.2d at 
162. 
Such is the case here. All of the other XanGo members, including the four 
identified by the court as similarly situated, seem willing to go along with the violation of 
XanGo's rights. Nevertheless, this should not foreclose Angel from bringing the 
derivative action on behalf of the coiporation. If Angel is precluded from representing 
XanGo in the derivative action, XanGo would be left without a remedy for the 
Defendants1 alleged misconduct. 
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Angel sits in a unique position in this case because it is the only proper 
representative of minority members to prosecute this action, and it should therefore be 
allowed to proceed as a "class of one." The district court erred in determining that Angel 
is not a fair and adequate representative in the derivative action and committed reversible 
error in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order 
granting Appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). 
DATED this 1 Ith day of June, 2008. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
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A. Ruling Re: Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5-9 of Affidavits; 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 of the Declaration of Stephen Bean; 
and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit 344-356 
B. Affidavit of Aaron Garrity; Affidavit of Hugh Biesinger (On Behalf of Genesis 
Resource Development, LLC); Affidavit of Dee Grimmer; Affidavit of Lance 
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C. Declaration of Mary Anne Q. Wood 242-243 
D. Declaration of Stephen Bean 211-213 
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ADDENDUM A 
F!LED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, suing derivatively on behalf of 
XanGo, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH 
MORTON, and KENT WOOD, 
Defendants. 
RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 5-9 OF 
AFFIDAVITS; DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO STRIKJE PARAGRAPHS 4-7 OF THE 
DECLARATION OF STEPHEN BEAN; AND 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
DERIVATIVE SUIT 
Case No. 070401904 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5 through 9 
of Affidavits; Defendants1 Motion to Strike All or Portions of Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the 
Declaration of Stephen Bean; and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit. The motions are 
fully briefed and the Court heard oral argument on October 29, 2007. 
Having read the pleadings, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the 
Court now makes the following Ruling: 
RULING 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5 through 9 of Affidavits 
Plaintiff asks the Court to strike paragraphs two and five through nine of the affidavits of non-
defendants Justin Banner; Bederra Group, LLC; Nathan Brown; Bryan B. Davis; John Digles; Aaron 
1 
Ganit), Genesis Resouice De\elopment, LLC ("Genesis"), Dee Grimmer, Dennis Glimmer, Craig 
Hale, Gary Holhstei, Joe Morton, Gordon Morton Chi is Peteison, Sean Poyntei, Lance Schiffman, 
Robert Spanglei, Marc Walkei, and Kent Wood The affidavits contain unitoim statements 
Defendants concede that paragiaph two should be stncken as a legal conclusion Howevei, Defendants 
assert that the lemainder oi the paragiaphs aie appropriate testimony and should not be stricken 
"[A]ffidauts shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matteis 
stated therein " Utah R Ci\ P 56(e) While Rule 56 relates specifically to motions foi summary 
judgment, affidavit testimony must comply with the lules of evidence to be admissible under any 
circumstances 
The Court strikes paragiaph two because it is a legal conclusion as conceded by Defendants 
The Court also stakes paragiaphs fi\e and six, finding that they lack foundation Utah R 
Evidence 602 Without foundation, in testifying that the witnesses aie unaware of facts which would 
support the complaint, the paiagraphs suggest that the witnesses have not leviewed documents 01 facts 
other than the venfied complaint This places the w ltnesses in the position of being incompetent to 
testify as to whether oi not the complaint is supportable b> documents and lelevant facts 
The Court will not stake paragraph seven The opinion of the witnesses as to the propriety of 
the lawsuit should be lationalh based The tact that they know something about the lawsuit may be a 
basis for an expression that the) oppose the lawsuit However, they failed to state facts or piovide 
testimonv as to how thev come to the conclusion that the denvative action is not in then interests 
Should the> be educated as to such additional lacts the) might diaw a different conclusion This, 
however, is a question of weight The Court will let the statements stand, but recognizes that such 
statements aie made without describing the amount of knowledge they have concerning the conduct of 
the Defendants Noting this, the witnesses have given a statement of then general position regarding the 
continuation of the lawsuit 
The couit stnkes paragraph eight in part The Court will leave statements that the witnesses are 
awaie of a sepaiate lawsuit biought alleging direct claims by the same lawyeis The Court will strike 
the reference that the witnesses know of one and perhaps two members of Angel Investors, LLC who 
have invested in a competitor, since the statement is without foundation Id 
The Couit will not strike paragraph nine It is a permissible statement of the witnesses regarding 
then view as to the propriety of the lawsuit However, similar to paragraph seven, the statement is an 
expression without information legarding whethei 01 not it is a considered conclusion based on a review 
of the foundeis' conduct The Court tecognizes the statement in that light 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 of the Declaration ot Stephen Bean 
Defendants move to strike portions of Stephen Bean's affidavit, asserting that the paragraphs are 
irrelevant, are not based on personal knowledge, and contain heaisay Plaintiff asseits that Mi Bean's 
statements are based on peisonal know ledge and are not hearsay, because they are offeied for the 
purpose of impeachment lather than for their truth In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the statements 
should be consideied m the light of Plaintiffs rule 56(f) affida\ it of counsel as good faith statements as 
to what is expected to be uncoveied thiough discovery 
The Court fust concludes that Rule 56(f) does not apply Defendants have not made a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on failuie to state a cause of action foi which relief can be gi anted 
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Instead Defendants hav e based their motion to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(1), which is not subject to 
conversion to a motion foi summary judgment Rule 56(f) is only applicable to motions for summary 
judgment 
The Court strikes paiagiaphs tour through se\en ot Mr Bean's declaration Paragraph four 
contains speculation and lacks foundation demonstrating peisonal know ledge Utah R E\ idence 602 
Paragraph five lacks foundation and contains inele\ant information Id at 402, 602 Mr Bean's 
personal knowledge regarding Genesis' support of Plaintiffs direct claims against XanGo does not 
pro\ ide him with a basts to state that Genesis affidavit opposing Plamtilf s derivative suit is 
"incorrect " Paragiaphs six and seven both contain inadmissible hearsay, Plaintiffs assertion that the 
statements are offered for impeachment purposes does not altei then status as inadmissible hearsay 
offeied for then tiuth Id at 801, 802 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit 
Defendants mo\e to dismiss this suit under Rule 23 1, aiguing that the Court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing, having failed to meet the requirements for 
filing a derivative lawsuit See Utah R Civ P 21 1 Deiendants assert that the suit should be dismissed 
because although Plaintiff owns 1% of XanGo Plaintiff is not a membei of XanGo and Plaintiff does 
not faulv and adequately represent the interests of XanGo s members Defendants argue that 1) Plaintiff 
is not a member, having failed to sign the XanGo operating agieement 2) one or more of Plaintiff Angel 
Investors, LLC's ("Angel") members maintains an ownership inteiest in an entity that competes directly 
with XanGo 3) Plaintiff is currently puisumg a dnect lawsuit against XanGo seeking money damages 
and dissolution of XanGo ( the Duett Lawsuit ) 4) Plaintiffs puipose m filing the derivative suit is to 
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acquire leverage against XanGo; and 5) the nineteen separate individual entities who represent the 
remaining 99% ownership of XanGo have provided sworn affidavits by which they oppose Plaintiffs 
representation in the derivative suit. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' arguments are not appropriate in a motion to dismiss and that 
the Court should not consider the arguments until discoveiy is completed. Plaintiff also asserts that it is 
a member of XanGo and that this suit is in the best interest of all non-defendant members of XanGo. 
Plaintiff argues that neither its direct lawsuit against XanGo nor the fact that members of Angel may 
have ownership interest in a competitor of XanGo creates a conflict of interest that prevents Plaintiff 
from proceeding in this derivative lawsuit. Plaintiff asserts that it fairly and adequately represents the 
interests the interests of XanGo's members. While Defendants have provided affidavits of the other 
members stating opposition to the derivative lawsuit, Plaintiff asserts that those affidavits are from the 
controlling members or from entities which are vulnerable to coercion by the controlling members. In 
the alternative, Plaintiff argues that it is the only minority member "which is not in a position to be 
coerced or bribed by the Defendants," and should therefore be allowed to proceed as a class of one. 
Opposition at iii. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 permits cta derivative action [to be] brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association . . . . 
The Rule further states that k'[t]he derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff 
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated 
in enforcing the right of the corporation or association." Rule 23.1 requires a court to dismiss a 
derivative action if the court finds the Plaintiff does not meet the Rule's requirements See LeVanger v. 
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Highland Estates Props. Owners Ass'n, 2003 UT App. 377, ^ 18, 80 P.3d 569. 
Because Plaintiffs pleadings allege that Plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of 
the other members, "the burden is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff is an inadequate 
representative under rule 23.1 . . . and, therefore, does not have standing." Id. at ^ 18. The determination 
of whether a party has standing "is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual findings 
that bear on the issue." Id. at [^ 8. A motion under 12(b)(1) must be made before further pleading. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). The Court finds that it is appropriate to address Defendants' motion at this time 
and finds that Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion does not apply, because Defendants1 motion is not based on 
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. 
Defendants first argue that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff is not a member of XanGo. 
On October 22, 2007 in the Direct Lawsuit, the Court mled from the bench that there are factual issues 
regarding whether Plaintiff is a member of XanGo. See Utah Fourth District Court, case no. 
060402848. The parties have not presented additional information or argument in this case that 
persuades the Court to alter its findings in the Direct Lawsuit. Therefore, the Court will not grant 
Defendants' motion to dismiss based on their argument that Plaintiff is not a member of XanGo. 
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
other non-defendant owners of XanGo. Plaintiff first asserts that it is a class of one and can therefore 
continue in the derivative suit even if the Court finds it is not an adequate representative of the other 
non-defendant XanGo owners. In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that six affiants, the 
founding or controlling members, represent 86% of XanGo's ownership; one affiant, Genesis, 
previously concurred with Plaintiff; and two members have special status giving them management 
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contiol While courts have allowed derivative lawsuits to proceed based on a finding that the Plaintiff is 
a class of one, the Court finds that Plaintiff in this case is not a class of one See Hall v Tennessee 
Dressed Beef Co , 957 S W 2d ^36, 540 (lenn 1997) (a single shareholder may maintain a derivative 
action when it is the only shareholder "similarly situated") Any benefit conferred through the 
derivative lawsuit would be shared by all of the XanGo members based on their percentage of 
ownership, Plaintiff would not receive a separate or distinct benefit by prevailing in the deuvative 
action In addition, Plaintiff is not the only owner who has not signed the operating agreement, Genesis 
has not signed the operating agreement and is therefore in the same position as Plaintiff in that regard 
The Couit finds that other non-defendant XanGo owners are similarly situated Therefore, Plaintiff may 
not maintain the deuvative suit as a class of one 
Having determined that Plaintiff may not proceed as a class of one, the Court will theiefore 
considei whether Plaintiff is a fan and adequate repiesentative of the othei non-defendant XanGo 
owners Courts have consideied vaiious factots m determining whether a paity faulv and adequately 
represents other members in a derivative lawsuit These factors include 
economic antagonisms between representative and class, the remedy sought by plaintiff 
in the derivative action indications that the named plaintiff was not the dnv ing fotce 
behind the litigation, plaintiffs unfamiharity wrth the litigation, other litigation pending 
between the plaintiff and defendants, the lelative magnitude of plaintiffs personal 
interests as compared to his interest in the derivative action itself, plaintiffs 
vindictiveness towaid the defendants, and, finally, the degree of support plaintiff was 
receiving from the shareholder he purported to repiesent 
Davis v Corned, Inc , 619 P 2d 588, 594 (6th Cir 1980) Consideration of one or mote factots may lead 
the court to detetmme that' outside entanglements render it likely that the representative may 
disiegard the interests oi the class members" oi othei wise determine that the plaintiff would not be a fair 
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and adequate representative ot the other members. Id. at 593, citing Blum v. Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Co. of New York, 539 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Several of the factors are not in dispute in this case. Neither party asserts that an entity other 
than Plaintiff is the driving force behind this litigation, nor does either party suggest that Plaintiff or 
Plaintiffs attorneys are unfamiliar with this litigation. Wliile Defendants may disagree with the remedy 
Plaintiff seeks, they have not alleged that the remedy sought is inappropriate. 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has a conflict of interest because members of Angel have an 
interest in a company that competes with XanGo. The parties have not provided the Court with any 
information regarding the type of business in which Angel's members may have an interest, the extent 
of their interests, or the extent of the competition between XanGo and the other business. While interest 
in competing companies may prevent a plaintiff from being a representative in a derivative lawsuit, the 
Court cannot find that to be the case here based on the current record. The Court is unpersuaded by 
Defendants' arguments that ownership of an unnamed owner of Angels in an unnamed competitor 
constitutes a conflict of interest sufficient to bar representation. There is insufficient information 
regarding the outside interests to determine that Plaintiff "may disregard the interests of the class 
members" based on those interests. Id. 
In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not a fair and adequate representative because it is 
currently seeking money damages and dissolution in the Direct Lawsuit against XanGo. Members do 
have a "right to bring direct and derivative actions simultaneously" although they always create a 
"theoretical conflict of interest." In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 455 F.Supp 999, 
1014 (D.C.I11. 1978). Despite the potential conflict of interest, there is no "per se rule" prohibiting a 
plaintiff in a direct suit from simultaneousl) representing membeis in a derivative suit Id If only a 
potential conflict is present, the cases ma> both proceed, the Court may take appropriate action if an 
actual conflict arises Id Some couits ha\e only allowed a derivative suit to continue in addition to a 
direct suit if the plaintiff is only representing itself m the derivative suit See Hall v Tenness Dressed 
BeefCo, 957 S W 2d 536 (Tenn 1997), Outen v Micaf 454 S E 2d 883 (N C Ct App 1995) 
However, other courts have allowed derivative representation to continue even when the plaintiff 
lepresents the interests of other ovvneis See Transocean, 455 F Supp at 1014, Bertozzi v King Louie 
International, Inc , 420 F Supp 1166, 1180 (D R I 1976) 
In this case, the Plaintiffs direct action seeks dissolution of XanGo It is possible that the Direct 
Lawsuit will not decrease Plaintiffs interest in pui suing the derivative claims for the benefit of all non-
defendant XanGo owners because any distribution to Plaintiff upon dissolution would be increased if 
Plaintiff is successful in the denvative suit However, the interests of Plaintiff and the other non-
defendant owners aie not aligned legaidmg the Dnect Lawsuit The Court finds that theie may be some 
actual conflict between Plaintiffs interest in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative 
suit 
Defendants argue Plaintiff is pursuing the derivative lawsuit foi the purpose of gaining leverage 
against XanGo in the Direct Lawsuit Plaintiff argues that its motive is simply to bring funds back into 
XanGo that have been removed thiough malfeasance The Court will not make a finding regarding 
Plaintiffs motives based merely on the allegations of the parties 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not an adequate lepresentative because all XanGo ovvneis 
excepting Plaintiff have asserted b) affidavit that the) oppose the suit and Plaintiffs lepiesentation 
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Plaintiff argues that the nineteen owner affidavits do not prove Plaintiff is an inadequate representative 
and that the derivative action is in the best interest of all owners which have not committed malfeasance. 
In addition Plaintiff asserts that the affidavits are an inaccurate representation of the other owners' 
positions regarding this action, because the other owners are all affected by the controlling members and 
that there is evidence of coercion. Whether or not Plaintiffs allegations are true, the Court finds that the 
other owners of XanGo are independent actors and have the ability and right to take a position that may 
be against their best interests. 
In Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co. the trial court determined that plaintiff was not a fair and adequate 
representative when "79 of the 84 stockholders representing 94% of the stockholders and 96% of the 
outstanding stock'1 indicated to the court that they did not believe that plaintiff was a fair and adequate 
representative. 449 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1971). The appellate court upheld the court's decision, but 
on other grounds. Id. Without deciding the question, the appellate court stated regarding the 
stockholder's lack of support, 
A quantitative requirement would be particularly difficult to apply in this case since it 
is not clear with reference to the derivative (i. e. the corporation's) cause of action 
which shareholders should be considered "similarly situated" or which "interests" of the 
shareholders must be protected. Those who opposed the suit hold approximately 96% 
of the Company's outstanding shares; but they may be considered in three separate 
categories: (1) the defendants; (2) employees of the Company; and (3) the principal 
defendant's two sisters and their children and related trusts. 
Id. at n. 4. However, in Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., the court dismissed a derivative suit, finding that 
plaintiff was not a fair and adequate representative when the individual defendants who jointly owned 
70% of the corporation asserted "that plaintiffs interests are obviously antagonistic to theirs and . . . 
submitted affidavits of the remaining six shareholders each of whom contends that the plaintiff does not 
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represent their interest and, that the suit is not brought in the best interest of the corporation.") 420 F. 
Supp. 226, 230 (D. Pa. 1976). 
In this case, the evidence before the court shows that six of the nineteen affiants are the 
Defendants and two have a family relationship with a Defendant. As of September 30, 2006, the 
Defendants owned 86.1% of XanGo. Seven other affiants are employees of XanGo. Only four of the 
affiants do not have an employee or family relationship to the Defendants or the company of which the 
Defendants are the majority owners. While Defendants, their family members, and the XanGo 
employees may not be similarly situated to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the four remaining affiants are 
similarly situated to Plaintiff. 
Those four remaining affiants have each clearly stated that they oppose the derivative suit and 
oppose Plaintiff representation. It is unclear from the affidavits exactly how much information the 
affiants have regarding Defendants' alleged malfeasance, but each affiant states that they have read 
Plaintiffs complaint, which includes a description of the alleged malfeasance. The affiants have clearly 
determined that even if the alleged malfeasance is occurring, they prefer to allow its continuance rather 
than allow XanGo to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. The Court finds these affidavits convincing 
evidence that Plaintiffs interests are not aligned with the other members which are similarly situated; 
the other members have clearly chosen to take a different course than Plaintiff. 
Considering the Plaintiffs interest in the Direct Lawsuit and the clear lack of support from the 
other similarly situated XanGo owners, the Court concludes that Defendants have met their burden of 
demonstrating that Plaintiff would not be a fair and adequate representative of the non-defendant owners 
in the derivative suit. Therefore, Plaintiff may not proceed as representative in the derivati\e suit. 
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While the Court does not condone any malfeasance on the part XanGo's founders, it cannot allow a 
derivative suit to continue against the will of all other similarly situated XanGo owners when Plaintiff is 
not a distinct class of one and when Plaintiff has some conflict of interest in its representation because of 
its Direct Lawsuit against XanGo. 
The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the derivative lawsuit. Counsel for Defendants 
is directed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
DATED this £/_ day of December, 2007. 
BY THE COURT IFHV, 
rict Court Judge 
N/
"OCM*U-u ^ 
12 
j "i. o 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
'2_1 day of December, 2007 to the following at the addresses indicated: 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark F. James 
Phillip J. Russell 
Hatch, James, & Dodge, PC 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUM B 
MarkF lames (5295) 
HATCH FAMES &DODGF 
10 West Bioadwa}, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Cit), Utah 84101 
Telephone (801)363-6363 
Facsimile (801)363-6666 
Attorneys for Aaron Garnty, Bryan Davis, Gary 
Holhster, Gordon Morton Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, purportedly suing 
denvatively on behalt of XanGo, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, 
GARY HOLLISTER, GORDON 
MORTON, JOSEPH MORTON, and KENT 
WOOD, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF AARON GARRITY 
Case No 070401904 
Judge Houaid 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY Of UTAH ) 
AARON GARRITY being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows 
1 I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have 
knowledge of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affida\ it of: my own fiee 
will and choice I have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of m} own 
choosing pnot to signing this affida\it 
2. I own a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ("XanGo"). I received that 
interest as one of XanGo's original founders As one of the founding Members of 
XanGo, I signed the original Operating Agreement of XanGo dated September 2002, and 
I have also signed the September 1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of 
XanGo. 
3. I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly 
known as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). In connection with a loan to XanGo, Angel 
Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. 
Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but Angel Investors declined to 
do so. 
4. I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements 
where I have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private 
information, and I believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such 
information remain confidential and private. 
5. I have reviewed the "Verified Complaint and Jury Demand* (the 
"Complaint") Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") filed in the above-captioned 
action. I have knowledge of the basic facts relating to the issues raised in the Complaint, 
and believe that the claims set forth in the Complaint are without merit. 
6. I am not aware of any facts that support the allegations of the Complaint. 
In fact, I believe my own actions, along with the actions of other members of XanGo's 
management team, hav been highly effective, successful, and in the best interest of the 
Company. Whether amounts paid as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I 
believe the total compensation paid to me, and to other members of XanGo's 
management team, is reasonable and, if anything, below the compensation paid to 
similarly situated executives. In my opinion, XanGo's success as a company is primarily 
tied to the efforts of our management team. 
7. Because I believe it has no merit, I strongly oppose the lawsuit that Angel 
Investors claims to have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is 
in the interest of XanGo or in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit 
proceed. 
8. I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct 
claims against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that 
Angel Investors is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed 
the Complaint in the derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps 
two, of the members of Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo. 
9. Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had 
merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, 
which I do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in 
my capacity as a Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or 
properly represents the interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of 
XanGo, I am opposed to a company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign 
the Amended Operating Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to 
as embodying the proper way to govern this company), who have asserted direct claims 
against XanGo in another case (which is pending before this Court), and / or who have a 
financial or other interest in a direct competitor 
DATED this |Q da\ of July, 2007 
AaronG^frity 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this )ftfrvday of July 2007, by 
Aaron Garrity. 
CINDY BLAKE 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STA TE of UTAH 
13775 S 2200 W 
RIVERTO^&j!I]84065 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES- 05-05-2009 NotaryTublic^' 
Mark F.James (5295) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6363 
Facsimile: (801)363-6666 
Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary 
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, purportedly 
suing derivatively on behalf of XanGo, 
LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, 
GARY HOLLISTER, GORDON 
MORTON, JOSEPH MORTON, and 
KENT WOOD, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HUGH BIESINGER 
(On Behalf of Genesis Resource 
Development, LLC) 
Case No. 070401904 
Judge Howard 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
HUGH BIESINGER being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have 
knowledge of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free 
will and choice. I have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own 
choosing prior to signing this affidavit. 
2. I am the Manager of Genesis Resource Development, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company ("Genesis"). Genesis is an owner of an interest in and asserts that it is 
a member of XanGo, LLC ("XanGo") 
I make this affidavit as an authorized representative and on behalf of Genesis. 
3. I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly 
known as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC") I am informed and believe that Angel 
Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. 
4. I am a party to a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I 
have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information 
shared with me on July 10, 2007, and I believe it is important (both to XanGo and its 
Members and investors) that such information remain confidential and private. 
5. I have reviewed the " Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the 
"Complaint) Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") filed in the above-captioned 
action. I have had an opportunity to consider the allegations contained in the Complaint, 
including asking questions about the allegations of a XanGo representative, and 
reviewing any documents I requested to review I have had, and have been advised that I 
will continue to have, full opportunity to conduct or perform any additional investigation 
that I see fit to perform with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint. 
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6. My concern is that if Angel Investors acts as a representative of all owners 
or interest holders in XanGo, confidential financial information may be shared with 
parties outside of this closely held organization and that such sharing could cause damage 
to XanGo and its financial status. 
7. I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct 
claims against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that 
Angel Investors is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed 
the Complaint in the derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps 
two, of the members of Angel Investors may have invested in a company that may be a 
competitor of XanGo. 
8. I have not had enough opportunity to determine whether any of Angel's 
claims have merit. However, if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made 
in the lawsuit had merit; if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, or if 
I believed that a similar lawsuit should proceed, I do not believe Angel Investors 
adequately or completely represents the interests of XanGo or the Members and interest 
holders of XanGo. Additionally, Genesis is not convinced that it is good to have a 
company comprised of individuals who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in 
another case (which is pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other 
interest in a direct competitor bringing this type of action on behalf of XanGo. 
DATED this /Iff day of July, 2007. 
Genesis Resource Development, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company 
f\ Bi^ sitTger, Manager 
SUBSCRIBED AND S W Q ^ JOl^fore me this jQ day of July 2007, by 
Hugh Biesinger, Manager of Genesis Resource Development, LLC 
MMKFJAMES 
Notary Pub*: 
Stat* of Utah 
My Comm, E*pfrw Feb 18 2009 
tryyygy"* 
Notary Public 
|1QWBfOQdwoySU»»4 
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Mark F. James (5295) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-6363 
Facsimile: (801)363-6666 
Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary 
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, purportedly suing 
derivatively on behalf of XanGo, LLC, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH 
MORTON, and KENT WOOD, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEE GRIMMER 
Case No. 070401904 
Judge Howard 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
DEE GRIMMER being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have knowledge 
of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free will and choice. I 
have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own choosing prior to signing this 
affidavit. 
2. I own a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ('XanGo"). I received that interest as 
the result of a loan I made to XanGo, on essentially the same terms as the investment Angel 
Investors, LLC received from XanGo. I became a member of XanGo by signing the September 
1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo. 
3. I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly known 
as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). I also understand that, in connection with a loan to XanGo, 
Angel Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. I also 
understand that Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but has declined to do so. 
4. I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I 
have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information, and I 
believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such information remain 
confidential and private. 
5. I have reviewed the ''Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the "Complaint") 
Angel Investors filed in the above-captioned action. I have had an adequate opportunity to 
consider the allegations contained in the Complaint, including asking questions about the 
allegations, and reviewing any documents I requested to review. I have had, and continue to 
have, foil opportunity to conduct or perfomi any additional investigation that I see fit to perform 
with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint. 
6. I am not aware of facts that support the allegations of the Complaint. In fact, I 
believe XanGo's management has done an excellent job of managing the company and have 
acted in the best interest of the Company. Whether amounts paid to XanGo executives comes to 
them as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I do not believe the total compensation 
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paid to them is excessive or a concern. In my opinion, it would be difficult to overstate the 
contribution of XanGo's executives to the success of the company. 
7. I do not support - in fact, I oppose - the lawsuit that Angel Investors claims to 
have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is in the interest of XanGo or 
in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit proceed. 
8. I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct claims 
against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that Angel Investors 
is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed the Complaint in the 
derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps two, of the members of 
Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo. 
9. Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had 
merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, which I 
do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in my capacity as a 
Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or properly represents the 
interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of XanGo, I am opposed to a 
company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign the Amended Operating 
Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to as embodying the proper way to 
3 
govern this company), who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in another case (which is 
pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other interest in a direct competitor 
DATED this £ t day of July, 2007. 
Dee Grimmer 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
Grimmer 
3L day of July 2007, by Dennis 
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Mark F. James (5295) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-6363 
Facsimile: (801) 363-6666 
Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary 
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, purportedly suing 
derivatively on behalf of XanGo, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH 
MORTON, and KENT WOOD, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LANCE SCHIFFMAN 
Case No. 070401904 
Judge Howard 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
LANCE SCHIFFMAN being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have knowledge 
of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free will and choice. I 
have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own choosing prior to signing this 
affidavit. 
ORIGINAL 
2. I am the Manager of Go XanGo, LLC and Mae Properties, LLC, both Utah 
limited liability companies. I have owned a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ("XanGo"), 
individually and am in the process of assigning that interest and the interest owned by Go 
XanGo, LLC to Mae Properties, LLC and I am authorized to represent the interests of those 
entities. I, or the entities referenced above, received that interest as the result of a loan I made to 
XanGo, on essentially the same terms as the investment Angel Investors, LLC received from 
XanGo. I, or the entities referenced above, became members of XanGo by signing the 
September 1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo. 
I make this affidavit, individually and as an authorized representative and on behalf of 
Go XanGo, LLC and Mae Properties, LLC. 
3. I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly known 
as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). I also understand that, in connection with a loan to XanGo, 
Angel Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. I also 
understand that Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but has declined to do so. 
4. I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I 
have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information, and I 
believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such information remain 
confidential and private. 
5. I have reviewed the "Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the "Complaint") 
Angel Investors filed in the above-captioned action. I have had an adequate opportunity to 
consider the allegations contained in the Complaint, including asking questions about the 
allegations, and reviewing any documents I requested to review. I have had, and continue to 
2 
have, full opportunity to conduct or perfomi any additional investigation that I see fit to perform 
with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint. 
6. I am not aware of facts that support the allegations of the Complaint. In fact, I 
believe XanGo's management has done an excellent job of managing the company and have 
acted in the best interest of the Company Whether amounts paid to XanGo executives comes to 
them as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I do not believe the total compensation 
paid to them is excessive or a concern. In my opinion, it would be difficult to overstate the 
contribution of XanGo's executives to the success of the company. 
7. I do not support - in fact, I oppose - the lawsuit that Angel Investors claims to 
have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is in the interest of XanGo or 
in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit proceed. 
8. I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct claims 
against XanGo and seeking damages from the company I also understand that Angel Investors 
is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed the Complaint in the 
derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps two, of the members of 
Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo. 
9. Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had 
merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, which I 
do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in my capacity as a 
Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or properly represents the 
interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of XanGo, I am opposed to a 
company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign the Amended Operating 
Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to as embodying the proper way to 
3 
govern this company), who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in another case (which is 
pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other interest in a direct competitor 
DATED this 7 ^ day of July, 2007 
LanceS^hiffman, individually, and on behalf of Go 
XanGo, LLC, and Mae Properties, LLC, Utah 
limited liability companies. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this p\ day of July 2007, by Lance 
Schiffman. 
Notary Public 
ADDENDUM C 
WOOD CRAPO ixc 
Mary Aane Q. Wood (3539) 
Richard J. Armstrong (7461) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah ] 
limited liability company, suing derivatively ] 
on behalf of Xango LLC, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. , 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY ; 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH ; 
MORTON, and KENT WOOD, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) DECLARATION OF 
) MARY ANNE Q. WOOD 
) Civil No. 070401904 
) Judge Fred D. Howard 
MARY ANNE Q. WOOD declares and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to testify to the 
matters stated herein. 
2. Prior to filing this lawsuit, I asked counsel for Xango if they would 
stipulate to the amendment of the Complaint in Angel Investors, LLC V. Xango, LLC, Civil No. 
060402848, to include derivative claims against the managing members. Counsel for Xango said 
they could not stipulate to an amendment of the Complaint. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
EXECUTED this C ^ *
 d a y 0f August, 2007. 
S.\WPDATAVP1.EAD[NG\ANGEL INVESTORS DERJVA"11VE MARY ANNE WOOD DECLARATION uT . i 2 
ADDENDUM D 
WOOD CRAPO LIC 
Mary Anne Q. Wood (3530) 
Richard J. Armstrong (7461) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah ; 
limited liability company, suing derivatively ] 
OH behalf of Xango LLC, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
AARON GARR1TY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY ) 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, ) 
JOSEPH MORTON, and KENT WOOD, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) DECLARATION OF 
) STEPHEN BEAN 
Civil No. 070401904 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
STEPHEN BEAN declares and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to testify to the 
matters stated herein. 
2. 1 am familiar with most of the individuals and companies that signed 
affidavits in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss, and am familiar with the family and other 
affiliations these individuals have to some of the six defendants. 
3. Chris Peterson, identified in Affidavit No. 14. and Lance Schiffman, 
identified in Affidavit No. 16, are both related to Aaron Garrity or his wife. 
4. More significantly, they are both among the largest distributors in the 
Xango organization, probably making over $100,000 a month. As such, Aaron Garrity controls 
their income because their distributor organizations are dependent upon Aaron Garrity's ability to 
maintain their distributor organizations through waivers of distributor policies and piocedures and 
other preferential treatment. 
5. With respect to the Affidavit of Genesis Resource Development LLC 
("Genesis Group"), I know that many of the representations are incorrect. Members of the 
Genesis Group consulted with Angel Investors prior to the filing of the Complaint in the direct 
action They reviewed drafts of the Complaint and paid a portion of the legal fees for filing the 
Complaint. They have been kept informed of the progress in both lawsuits and expressed 
continual support for Angel Investors' efforts in representing the minority shares against the 
company. 
6. Both Hugh Biesinger and Mike Mansfield, who are the principals behind 
Genesis Group, expressly asked Angel Investors to proceed with the lawsuit as it was a direct 
benefit to them. They also asked that their involvement in financing and drafting the Complaint be 
2 
kept confidential from Xango as they were worried it would rum their opportunity to sell then-
shares back to the company. 
7. Recently, Hugh Biesinger told me that Craig Hale, General Counsel for 
Xango, told the Genesis Group that their shares would not be bought back before the lawsuit with 
Angel Investors was eliminated. I believe for this reason the Genesis Group was pressured into 
filing the affidavit on behalf of the company. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
EXECUTED this (g ^ day of August, 2007. 
STEPHEN BEAN 
S < \ " P O A T A PLEADING ANGEL INVESTORS DERIVATIVE STEPHEN Dh \N DECLARATION *pd 3 
ADDENDUM E 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mar>' Anne Q. Wood (3539) 
Richard J. Armstrong (7461) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah ; 
limited liability company, suing derivatively ] 
on behalf of Xango LLC, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. 
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY ; 
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH ; 
MORTON, and KENT WOOD, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) DECLARA TION OF RICHARD J. 
) ARMSTRONG PURSUANT TO 
) RULE 56(f) 
) Civil No. 070401904 
) Judge Fred D. Howard 
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG, declares and states as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify regarding the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah, a member of 
the law firm of Wood Crapo LLC, and one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff Angel 
Investors, LLC, in the above-entitled derivative action. 
3. The verified complaint and jury demand in this case was filed on June 19, 
2007. 
4. The parties have not conducted any discovery in this matter. 
5. The parties have not had the opportunity to meet and confer as required 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(f) to discuss a proposed case management order or proposed discovery 
plan. 
6. Discovery is expected to uncover important material facts regarding 
Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
7. One such fact relates to the issue of whether Plaintiff fairly and adequately 
represents the interests of similarly situated members of XanGo, LLC; whether there are similarly 
situated members of XanGo, LLC; and the basis for the testimony provided in the 19 affidavits 
submitted by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. 
8. Discovery is also expected to uncover important material facts regarding 
the alleged misconduct of Defendants and the knowledge of that conduct by the other minority 
interest owners; and whether other minority interest owners have been subjected to the same 
alleged oppressive conduct to which Plaintiff has been subjected. 
9. This alleged misconduct includes Defendants' misappropriation of 
corporate opportunities b\ buying minority interests with funds borrowed from the company 
rather than having the company purchase the in t - ^ t s ; the payment of excessive compensation, 
benefits, and perks, including but not limited to loans for the purchase of personal homes, lavish 
and unnecessary expenditures for corporate transportation, lavish and unnecessary expense 
reimbursements; and skimming of commissions and similar conduct which breaches fiduciary 
duties owed by the Defendants to XanGo, LLC and its minority interest holders. 
10. Related to the issue of whether there are similarly situated members of 
XanGo, LLC, is the issue of percentages of ownership interests of each of the 19 affiants. 
11. As one of the counsel for Plaintiff in the direct action pending before this 
Court, I have had the opportunity to view records designated as "confidential" and which relate 
to the percentage of membership interests in XanGo. 
12. Based on my review of those documents, it is my understanding that the 
principal shareholders of XanGo are the six defendants consisting of Gary Hollister, Aaron 
Garrity, Joe Morton, Gordon Morton, Bryan Davis, and Kent Wood, whose total ownership 
percentage in XanGo comprised 86.1 percent as of September 30, 2006. The remaining 13.9 
percent of XanGo is owned by minority investors, whose respective ownership percentages range 
from .10 percent to 3.3 percent. 
13. It is believed upon information that the total ownership of the six 
defendants has increased since September 30, 2006. 
14. It is anticipated that discovery will uncover the extent of ownership within 
the company, and the extent to which Plaintiff is a class of one and therefore the only fair and 
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adequate representative of XanGo for purposes of prosecuting this derivative action against 
Defendants. 
15. Plaintiffs counsel at Wood Crapo, LLC have represented direct sales 
companies like XanGo for approximately a combined total of 20 years. We have also 
represented minority interest holders in actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, our 
client is well-informed on the issues in this case and is dedicated and committed to pursuing the 
action to its end. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
EXECUTED on the 6th day of August, 2007. 
S:\WPDATA\PLEADING\ANGEL INVESTORS DERIVATIVE.RULE 56F DECLARATION.wpd 
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